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CASENOTES 
CRIMINAL LAW- EVIDENCE- EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT 
RAPE VICTIM SUFFERED POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISOR-
DER IS ADMISSIBLE TO REBUT A DEFENSE OF CONSENT. 
State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986). 
A defendant accused of raping his girlfriend's mother claimed that 
he was seduced, thereby raising the defense of consent. 1 The state rebut-
ted this defense by introducing expert testimony from a psychiatrist. The 
psychiatrist testified that, based upon his diagnosis, the victim suffered 
from "post traumatic stress disorder" (PTSD), and that, based upon the 
history furnished to him by the complainant, he believed the disorder 
was caused by the rape. The Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore 
County ruled that the testimony was admissible because PTSD is ac-
cepted generally within the scientific community and "would be helpful 
to the jury in its determination as to whether the sexual intercourse was 
consensual. " 2 The jury found the defendant guilty of second degree 
rape. 3 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the convic-
tion and remanded for a new trial, holding that PTSD testimony is inad-
missible to prove nonconsent in a criminal rape trial because the 
testimony's prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. 4 The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment of the court of special 
appeals, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admit-
ting the PTSD testimony.5 
1. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 91, 517 A.2d 741, 742 (1986). 
2. Record at 4-35 to 36. 
3. Allewalt, 308 Md. at 97, 517 A.2d at 745. The jury also found defendant guilty of 
fourth degree sexual offense and common law assault. Id. 
4. Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. 503, 516, 487 A.2d 664, 670 (1985). 
5. /d. at 516, 487 A.2d at 670. 
For two reasons, the Allewalt facts did not present an ideal case to test the 
admissibility of PTSD testimony in a criminal rape trial. First, prior to the alleged 
rape, a psychiatric counselor diagnosed the complainant as being depressed. Id. at 
507, 487 A.2d at 665. This depression apparently was caused by her recent separa-
tion from her husband and her daughter's second pregnancy. /d. Some authorities, 
however, suggest that a reliable diagnosis of PTSD can be made even when the 
patient suffers from a general nervous disorder because PTSD symptoms are suffi-
ciently distinguishable as to allow a determination of PTSD despite the presence of 
the other symptoms. See A. BURGESS & L. HOLSTROM, RAPE: VICTIM OF CRISIS 
37, 47 n.2 (1974) (PTSD symptoms are different in rape victims with prior mental 
illness than in rape victims without prior mental illness, both in terms of intensity 
and duration.); Atkeson, Calhoun, Resick, & Ellis, Victims of Rape: Repeated As-
sessment of Depressive Symptoms, 50 CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 96, 
101 (1982) (rape victims with a history of psychological problems recover more 
slowly from depressive symptoms); Bassuk, A Crisis Theory Perspective on Rape re-
printed in MCCOMBIE, THE RAPE CRISIS INTERVENTION HANDBOOK 124, 126 
(1980) (preexisting psychopathology is important to determine the success of recov-
ery). 
Second, ample physical evidence of force was present in Allewalt which could 
have justified exclusion of the PTSD testimony as cumulative and a waste of time. 
See FED. R. Evm. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
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PTSD is a psychiatric and emotional disorder recognized by the 
American Psychiatric Association (AP A). 6 According to the AP A, 
symptoms of the disorder include re-experiencing the traumatic event 
through thoughts and dreams, numbing of emotional responses, hyper-
alertness, abnormal startle response, sleep disturbance, memory loss, in-
ability to concentrate, and avoidance of activities reminiscent of the 
stressful incident. 7 The symptoms may emerge immediately after the 
traumatic experience or after a latency period. 8 
PTSD is caused by a variety of traumatic events, including military 
combat, bombing, torture, death camps, airplane crashes, floods, earth-
quakes, assault, or rape. 9 The event causing the symptoms is generally 
outside the range of common experiences such as simple bereavement, 
chronic illness, business loss, or marital conflict. 10 Because the symptoms 
can be caused by any number of different traumatic events, the patient's 
explanation generally is required to ascertain the cause of PTSD. 11 
When rape is the traumatic event causing the symptoms, some psy-
chiatrists refer to the disorder as "rape trauma syndrome" (RTS). This 
terminology was used first in 1974 by the researchers Burgess and Holm-
strom. These researchers described R TS as having two phases: an initial 
acute phase characterized by fear, anger, and self-blame; and a long term 
reorganization phase, beginning two or three weeks later, characterized 
by nightmares and phobias. 12 In subsequent studies other researchers 
have identified the same rape trauma symptoms. 13 Some researchers be-
tive value is substantially outweighed ... by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."); see also MARYLAND 
TRIAL JUDGES HANDBOOK§ 4-701(c) ("[R]elevant evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of ... undue delay, waste 
of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."). 
6. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236-37 (3d ed. 1980). 
7. !d. at 238. 
8. Id. at 237. 
9. !d. at 236. 
10. Id. 
11. See Id. at 236-37 (listing various traumas that can cause PTSD, but not identifying 
various types or subclasses of PTSD caused by specific traumas). 
PTSD does not appear to have reached a level of sophistication that allows for 
the identification of the cause of the PTSD. Several studies indicate that there is no 
clearly identifiable set of symptoms in rape victims. See, e.g., T. McCAHILL, THE 
AFTERMATH OF RAPE 75 (1979) ("Clearly the concept of a typical rape victim has 
no place within the context of post rape adjustment."); Notman & Nadelson, The 
Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Considerations, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 408, 409 
(1976) ("Each rape victim responds to and integrates the experience differently de-
pending on her age, life situation, the circumstances of the rape, her specific person-
ality style, and the responses of those from whom she seeks support."). Thus, it 
does not appear that the symptoms of PTSD arising from rape are sufficiently distin-
guishable as to allow the diagnosing psychiatrist to identify rape as the cause of the 
disorder absent some statement by the victim identifying rape as the cause. 
12. See Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 981 
(1974) .. 
13. See, e.g., E. HILBERMAN, THE RAPE VICTIM 33-40 (1976); Atkeson, Calhoun, 
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lieve they can distinguish true rapes from false claims on the basis of 
RTS symptoms, 14 but the prevailing view apparently is that a psychia-
trist can determine only whether a patient suffers PTSD, not necessarily 
whether rape caused the PTSD. 15 
Courts accept PTSD testimony for various purposes. For example, 
courts accept PTSD testimony from Vietnam war veterans seeking ac-
quittal, probation, or reduced sentences in criminal prosecutions. 16 Both 
the Veterans Administration and the AP A recognize PTSD as a viable 
defense in court for those purposes. 17 Additionally, courts accept PTSD 
testimony to assess the full measure of damages in personal injury ac-
tions. For example, in personal injury suits arising from traumatic indus-
trial accidents, courts permit expert testimony that a plaintiff suffered 
shock trauma to determine damages for emotional and psychological in-
jury.18 Courts also allow PTSD testimony in civil rape cases, where the 
testimony is entered not to prove that a rape occurred, but only to assess 
damages once a rape has been proven. 19 In criminal rape trials, however, 
Resick, & Ellis, supra note 5, at 98-101; Bassuk, supra note 5, at 124-29; Kilpatrick, 
Veronen, & Resick, The Aftermath of Rape: Recent Empirical Findings, 49 AM. J. 
ORTHO. 658 (1978); Notman & Nadelson, supra note 11, at 409-12; Resick, The 
Trauma of Rape and the Criminal Justice System, THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, Spring 
1984, at 52; S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM 215-31 
(1979). 
14. See DePaul, The Rape Trauma Syndrome: New Weapon for Prosecutors, NAT'L L. 
J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1. 
15. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
16. See United States v. Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146, 1148 (4th Cir. 1982) (allowing testi-
mony that defendant suffers from post traumatic stress- "Vietnam Vet"- disor-
der to prove diminished capacity at time of crime); People v. Galvan, 156 Cal. App. 
3d 144, 202 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1984) (remanding criminal conviction case of Vietnam 
veteran to trial court to determine whether veteran should be placed in newly estab-
lished PTSD treatment program rather than prison). 
17. See Smith, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 20 TRIALS 99 (1984). 
18. Courts first accepted expert testimony that a plaintiff suffered shock trauma in in-
dustrial injury cases where plaintiffs sought damages for emotional and psychologi-
cal injuries caused by traumatic, life endangering accidents. See, e.g., Harris Coal 
Mining Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ill., 323 Ill. 880, 146 N.E. 543 (1925) (awarding 
damages for neurosis caused by electrical shock); United States Fuel Co. v. Indus. 
Comm'n of Ill., 313 Ill. 590, 145 N.E. 122 (1924) (awarding damages for psychoso-
matic illness caused by industrial accident); Porter v. Horace Williams Co., 9 So. 2d 
60 (La. Ct. App. 1942) (awarding damages for physical injuries caused by shock of 
injury); Wright v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 140 So. 713 (La. App. 1932) (award-
ing damages for psychosomatic illness caused by fall); Thompson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, 241 Mo. App. 683, 236 S.W.2d 36 (1951) (would have awarded 
damages for psychoneurosis if causal connection to accident was proven by clear 
medical evidence). 
19. See, e.g., Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F. Supp. 1111, 1122 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (allowing 
expert to testify about "the medical ramifications of rape trauma" in civil rights 
action against prison officials arising from homosexual rape of an inmate); Division 
of Corrections v. Wynn, 438 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (admitting 
RTS testimony to ascertain damages for rape); Alphonso v. Charity Hosp., 413 So. 
2d 982,986-87 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (awarding damages on basis ofPTSD); White v. 
Violent Crimes Compensation Bd., 76 N.J. 368, 388, 388 A.2d 206, 216 (1978) (de-
termining that RTS was "crime-induced incapacity" and allowing filing of claims 
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where the testimony is always entered to prove that a rape ooccurred,20 
the testimony has received a mixed reception. Of the nine states to con-
sider the question, six have allowed the testimony21 -three have not.22 
for duration of syndrome by tolling statute of limitations); Wesley v. Greyhound 
Lines, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 680, 687-88, 268 S.E.2d 855, 861 (1980) (permitting RTS 
testimony to prove that sexual assault had permanent psychological effects); Skaria 
v. State, 110 Misc. 2d 711, 715-16, 442 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841-42 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981) 
(allowing RTS testimony to prove damages in suit against state for rape in state-
owned residential unit). In one civil case, however, PTSD testimony was allowed to 
prove the rape itself. Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 176, 450 
N.E.2d 190, 198 (1983) (admitting RTS testimony in civil sexual assault action to 
show nonconsent because the syndrome is a recognized medical disorder). 
20. Because a prosecutrix does not receive money damages in a criminal rape trial, 
PTSD testimony is only entered in criminal rape trials to corroborate the prosecu-
trix' allegation of rape. No such corroboration of rape by an expert or other witness 
was necessary to convict for rape at common law. See 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 
§ 2061, at 451 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978). Many states, however, have adopted a 
formal requirement of corroboration. See, e.g., State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631 
(Iowa 1968); State v. Thompson, 198 Neb. 48, 251 N.W.2d 387 (1977); People v. 
Moore, 23 N.Y.2d 565, 297 N.Y.S.2d 944, 245 N.E.2d 710, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 
1006 (1969). Even in states with no formal corroboration requirement, courts rarely 
convict absent a modicum of circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Wiley, 
492 F.2d 547, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (studies suggest de-
fendant is unlikely to be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the com-
plainant even in those jurisdictions that do not require corroboration); see also 
Hibley, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent, 
and Character, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309 (1972) (sufficient proof of rape in major-
ity of cases dependent upon corroborative evidence);O'Neale, Court Ordered Psychi-
atric Examination of a Rape Victim in a Criminal Rape Prosecution, 18 SANTA 
CLARA L. REv. 119, 127 (1978) (despite absence of corroboration requirement, lit-
tle chance of conviction without corroboration of victim's testimony); Ross, The 
Overlooked Expert in Rape Prosecutions, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 707, 710 (1983) (where 
there is no corroborating evidence, jurors will convict in only 7 percent of rape 
cases). Maryland has no formal corroboration requirement. See Green v. State, 243 
Md. 75, 220 A.2d 131 (1966). Where circumstantial evidence is lacking, however, a 
conviction in Maryland may be reversed. See Craig v. State, 214 Md. 546, 136 A.2d 
243 (1957). 
The difficulties of producing the requisite corroborating evidence are increased 
where there is no physical evidence of rape. If there is no physical evidence of rape, 
the prosecutor may have serious difficulty persuading the jury that any crime oc-
curred. See Comment, Scientific Evidence in Rape Prosecutions, 48 U. Mo. K.C.L. 
REV. 216, 220 (1980). Because rape victims often will not struggle due to fear of 
death or serious bodily injury, many rape victims exhibit no physical injuries. Tonn, 
The Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome in Indiana, 17 IND. L. REV. 1143, 
1146 n.25 (citing studies where percentage of rape victims exhibiting physical inju-
ries ranged from 10.6% to 63%). 
21. See State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 699 P.2d 1290 (1985) (en bane); State v. McQuillen, 
236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 
(1982); State v. Liddell, -Mont. -, 685 P.2d 918 (1984); State v. Whitman, 16 
Ohio App. 3d 246, 475 N.E.2d 486 (1984); People v. Stull, 127 Mich. App. 14, 338 
N.W.2d 403 (1983); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978). In 
Stull and LeBrun, the testimony of the expert was not presented in terms of PTSD 
or RTS, but the issue of admissibility was the same as in the other cases inasmuch as 
the expert testified that the complainant's psychological profile was consistent with 
that of rape victims in order to assist the state in proving rape. 
22. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984) (en 
bane) State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982) (en bane); State v. McGee, 
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Despite the judicial split on the admissibility of PTSD testimony in crim-
inal rape trials, commentators agree that expert psychological testimony 
should be admissible to corroborate a complainant's allegation of 
nonconsent. 23 
In determining whether PTSD testimony is admissible in a criminal 
rape trial, courts generally make three inquiries, either implicitly or ex-
pressly. First, the broad inquiry is whether the probative value of the 
PTSD testimony outweighs its prejudicial effect. 24 Second, courts in-
324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982) (en bane) (companion case to Saldana); State v. Tay-
lor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984) (en bane). 
23. See 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 2061, at 464 ("in the light of mod-
em psychology, this technical rule of corroboration seems but a crude and childish 
measure . . . . Better to inculcate the resort to an expert scientific analysis of the 
particular [complaining] witness' mentality, as the true measure of enlighten-
ment."); see also Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape 
Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 
MINN. L. REv. 395, 469 (1985); Ross, supra note 20, at 732-34; Tonn, supra note 
20, at 1165-66 (1984); Wilk, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 33 AM. 
U.L. REv. 417, 461-62 (1984). 
24. Compare People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 
450, 460 (1984) (en bane) (PTSD testimony "unfairly prejudices" the defendant) 
(quoting Saldana); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982) (en bane) 
("such testimony is of no help to the jury and produces an extreme danger of unfair 
prejudice"); State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982) (en bane) (same); 
State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 234, 241 (Mo. 1984) (en bane) ("the peril of prejudice 
and confusion resulting from the opinion testimony substantially outweighs any 
probative value that it might have") with State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 63, 699 P.2d 
1290, 1294 (1985) (en bane) (the testimony is admissible to aid the jury; it does not 
invade the province of the jury because the expert is subject to cross-examination 
and the jury then determines what weight the evidence is to receive); State v. Marks, 
231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1291, 1299 (1982) (the syndrome is detectable and 
reliable as evidence and does not invade the province of the jury); State v. Liddell, 
-Mont.-, 685 P.2d 918, 923 ("Any relevant evidence which tends to support the 
existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue can only aid the jury determination, not 
mislead and confuse."); State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d 246, 247, 475 N.E.2d 
486, 488 (1984) ("the probative value of this testimony clearly outweighs the preju-
dicial impact"). 
The probative value - prejudicial effect balancing test is a traditional test for the 
admissibility of evidence. See 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 1864, at 
643 (confusion of issue and undue prejudice as grounds for exclusion); FED. R. 
EVID. 403 (excluding even relevant evidence if it presents danger of unfair prejudice, 
confuses the issue, misleads the jury, or wastes time). 
Maryland courts apply the probative value versus prejudicial effect balancing 
test. See, e.g., Reid v. State, 305 Md. 9, 501 A.2d 436 (1985) (probative value of 
photographs of murder victim not outweighed by prejudicial effect); Dorsey v. State, 
276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976) (probative value that high percent of detective's 
arrests lead to convictions outweighed by prejudicial effect); Blondes v. Hayes, 29 
Md. App. 663, 350 A.2d 163 (1976) (plaintiff-buyer of business seeking refund of 
purchase price on theory of seller misrepresentation could not testify that purchase 
money was money recovered for daughter's brain damage and was invested on 
daughter's behalf because probative value of such testimony is outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect). Maryland has not codified the rule, but it is included in the 
MARYLAND TRIAL JUDGES HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE§ 4-70l(c) ("Relevant evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
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quire whether PTSD is accepted generally in the scientific community.25 
Courts which find that the testimony is generally accepted invariably find 
that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect,26 Courts which 
ger of (l) unfair prejudice, or (2) confusion of issues or misleading the jury, or (3) 
undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."). 
25. Compare Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229 ("Rape trauma syndrome is not the type of 
scientific test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape has oc-
curred."); McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 233 (adopting Saldana rationale); Taylor, 663 
S.W.2d at 240 ("Dr. Amanat's statements that the prosecutrix suffered from rape 
trauma syndrome and that she had been raped are not sufficiently based on a scien-
tific technique."); Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rpt:. at 459 
(rape trauma syndrome is not relied upon in the scientific community to prove that 
a rape occurred) with Huey, 145 Ariz. at 63, 699 P.2d at 1294 (rape trauma syn-
drome is "generally accepted") (quoting Marks); Marks, 231 Kan. at 654, 647 P.2d 
at 1299 ("An examination of the [scientific] literature clearly demonstrates that the 
so-called 'rape trauma syndrome' is generally accepted to be a common reaction to 
sexual assault."); Liddell,- Mont. at-, 685 P.2d at 923 (although rape trauma 
syndrome is a relatively new psychiatric development, "the presence of rape trauma 
syndrome is detectable and reliable as evidence that a forcible assault took place") 
(quoting Marks); Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 247,475 N.E.2d at 488 ("review of 
the handbooks, journals, and textbooks ... successfully rebut the defendant's claim 
of a lack of a scientific foundation .... "). 
The general acceptance test was first set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), where the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held that expert testimony is only admissible if the methodology or con-
cept in question is accepted generally within the scientific community. The Frye test 
has come under increasing attack in recent years, however, because it serves to ex-
clude novel, but apparently reliable, scientific procedures. Consequently four of the 
federal circuits have rejected the Frye test. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 
1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985) (general acceptance rejected as an independent con-
trolling standard); Ferebee v. Chevron Chern., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535-36 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (novel inference is admissible under Maryland law if methodology upon 
which it is based is generally accepted); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 
(6th Cir. 1977) (neither newness nor lack of absolute certainty in scientific test suf-
fices to render it inadmissible; usefulness is criterion); United States v. Baller, 519 
F.2d 466 (4th Cir. 1975) (general acceptance rejected and replaced with relevance 
test). At least five states also have relaxed the Frye test or rejected it altogether. See 
Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (methodology must 
meet Frye test "or must be shown to have passed from stage of experimentation and 
uncertainty to that of reasonable demonstrability"), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 
(1970); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978) (relevance and helpfulness, not 
general acceptance, is the standard); State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912, 
aff'd, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975) (Frye rejected; relevance and helpfulness is 
the test); People v. Daniels, 102 Misc. 2d 540, 422 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1979) 
(Frye rejected; substantive probative value is proper test); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 
P.2d 1228, 1234 (Utah 1980) (admissibility not governed solely by general accept-
ance; test that has passed from experimental stage may be admissible if its reliability 
is reasonably demonstrable). 
Maryland courts also apply the Frye standard. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 
381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978) ("(I]f a new scientific technique's validity is in con-
troversy in the relevant scientific community, or if it is generally regarded as an 
experimental technique, then the expert testimony based upon its validity cannot be 
admitted into evidence."). But cf Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535-36 (novel inference is 
admissible under Maryland law if methodology upon which it is based is accepted 
generally). 
26. See Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1291; Liddell,- Mont.-, 685 P.2d 918; Whit-
man, 16 Ohio App. 3d 246, 475 N.E.2d 486; Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 699 P.2d 1290. 
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find that the testimony is not accepted generally invariably reach the op-
posite conclusion and exclude the evidence as unduly prejudicial on the 
theory that the jury erroneously will conclude that the expert is present-
ing a conclusion of scientific fact. 27 Third, courts consider the content of 
the testimony. If the expert merely states that the complainant exhibits 
PTSD symptoms, the testimony usually passes the general acceptance 
test, its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, and it is admitted 
into evidence.28 If the expert supplements that diagnosis with an opinion 
that the symptoms were caused by rape, the testimony usually fails the 
general acceptance test, its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative 
value, and it is not admitted into evidence.29 Therefore, the fundamental 
inquiry is on the content of the testimony. 
Case law supports this assessment of content as the germane factor. 
Among the eleven cases that involved the admissibility of PTSD in a 
criminal rape trial, seven allowed the testimony- four did not. 30 Of the 
seven cases that allowed the testimony, only one involved an opinion of 
rape. 31 Of the four cases that rejected the testimony, two cases involved 
an opinion of rape. 32 Thus, where the expert opines that there was rape 
27. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291,203 Cal. Rptr. 450; Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 
227; McGee, 324 N.W.2d 233; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 234. 
28. See supra notes 24 & 25. 
29. /d. As stated by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 
689 P.2d 822 (1984) "the common thread" in cases where PTSD testimony was 
rejected is that the expert stated that "he believed the victim was telling the truth in 
stating she was raped ... . "McQuillen, 236 Kan. at 169-70, 689 P.2d at 828. 
30. See supra notes 21 & 22. 
31. Compare McQuillen, 236 Kan. at 171, 689 P.2d at 829 (holding that the trial court 
erred in excluding RTS testimony because "the expert may testify that the patient/ 
victim does possess and exhibit the emotional and psychological trauma consistent 
with rape trauma syndrome"); Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299 (allowing 
testimony that expert thought that complainant had been the victim of "a frighten-
ing assault, an attack" and that she was suffering from the post-traumatic stress 
disorder known as rape trauma syndrome); Whitman, 16 Ohio App.3d at 247, 475 
N.E.2d at 488 (allowing testimony of post-shock reactions of rape victim); People v. 
Stull, 127 Mich. App. 14, 19, 338 N.W.2d 403, 406 (1983) (allowing testimony that 
expert "saw nothing in complainant consistent with the profile of a rape victim"); 
Huey, 145 Ariz. at 62, 699 P.2d at 1293 (allowing testimony that victim's mental 
state was consistent with the experience the complainant described to expert); State 
v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. 411, 415-16, 587 P.2d 1044, 1047 (1978) (allowing testi-
mony that the victim's emotional state comported with "what most of the women 
[sexual abuse victims] that come to the hospital are reacting like") with Liddell, -
Mont. at -, 685 P.2d at 922 (allowing testimony that "rape caused this post-trau-
matic stress syndrome in the victim"). 
32. Compare Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 (disal-
lowing testimony that complainant suffered from rape trauma syndrome); McGee, 
324 N.W.2d at 234 (Wahl, J., dissenting) ("Dr. Springrose did not testify, as did the 
expert witness in Saldana, as to whether, in his opinion, the rape actually occurred. 
Rather, he discussed some of the complainant's psychological symptoms after the 
alleged rape and stated that he found these symptoms to be consistent with rape 
trauma syndrome. Such evidence is probative on the issue of consent and thus help-
ful to the jury .... ") with Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229 (the expert stated "that she 
definitely believed Fuller was a victim of sexual assault and rape"); Taylor, 663 
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there is a significantly greater likelihood of exclusion. 
Several cases specifically illustrate the importance courts place on 
the content of the testimony. In State v. McQuillen,33 the Supreme Court 
of Kansas permitted the testimony because the expert stated only that 
the complainant possessed symptoms consistent with RTS without stat-
ing that the disorder was the result of rape. 34 In State v. Taylor, 35 the 
Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the expert's opinion that the com-
plainant was raped, but stated in dicta that an expert could testify "that 
the prosecutrix' symptoms were consistent with a traumatic experience 
-even a stressful sexual experience."36 In People v. Stul/,37 the Court of 
Appeals of Michigan permitted testimony that the complainant's symp-
toms were not inconsistent with the profile of a rape victim, emphasizing 
that the expert did not express an opinion as to whether the complainant 
had been raped.38 In People v. Bledsoe,39 the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia rejected the testimony, not because the expert stated that rape caused 
the disorder, which he did not, but because the expert stated that the 
complainant suffered from "rape trauma syndrome."40 The court found 
that "use of this terminology is likely to mislead the jury into inferring 
that such a classification reflects a scientific judgment that the witness 
was, in fact, raped."41 Absent the use of this terminology, it appears the 
Bledsoe court would have permitted the diagnosis of PTSD: "We hasten 
to add that nothing in this opinion is intended to imply that evidence of 
the emotional and psychological trauma that a complaining witness suf-
fers after an alleged rape is inadmissible in a rape prosecution. "42 
Courts disfavor PTSD causation opinion for several reasons. PTSD 
symptoms are not reliable proof of rape because the disorder can be ob-
served following any severe trauma.43 Additionally, the psychiatric com-
munity uses PTSD diagnosis not to prove rape, but only for purposes of 
therapy;44 any suggestion by an expert that the complainant was raped, 
based solely on the presence of rape trauma symptoms, unfairly 
S.W.2d at 237 (the expert testified "that the victim was not fantasizing when she 
described the rape"). 
33. 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984). 
34. McQuillen, 236 Kan. at 171, 689 P.2d at 829 ("He never stated that the victim was 
raped or that the stress which caused her disorder was the result of a rape. . . . The 
expert may testify that the patient/victim does possess and exhibit the emotional 
and psychological trauma consistent with rape trauma syndrome."). 
35. 663 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1984) (en bane). 
36. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241. 
37. 127 Mich. App. 14, 338 N.W.2d 403 (1983). 
38. Stull, 127 Mich. App. at 19, 338 N.W.2d at 406. 
39. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984) (en bane). 
40. Id. at 251 n.14, 681 P.2d at 301 n.14, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 n.14. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. 
43. See Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229 (the disorder can be observed following any severe 
trauma); McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 232 (adopting Saldana rationale); Taylor, 663 
S.W.2d at 240 (trauma syndrome could result from a number of stressful situations). 
44. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; Saldana, 
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prejudices the defendant.45 Consequently, the jury might rely unduly on 
the psychiatrist's testimony, thus relinquishing its role as the ultimate 
factfinder. 46 
Some researchers maintain, however, that the danger of undue jury 
reliance on expert testimony is more theoretical than actual. Studies in-
dicate that the jury will not relinquish its decision-making power because 
it realizes its importance and the responsibility it owes to the court and 
the community.47 Furthermore, jurors convict as often as judges in cases 
where expert testimony is presented.48 Additionally, some courts note 
that the danger of undue jury reliance in cases involving PTSD testimony 
can be minimized by a variety of safeguards. The defendant can cross-
examine the prosecution's expert witness,49 call his own opposing ex-
perts, 50 and request limiting instructions that PTSD symptoms are only 
circumstantial evidence of rape, not definitive scientific proof of rape. 5 1 
Finally, the court can require that the expert use the more generic termi-
nology "post traumatic stress disorder" rather than "rape trauma syn-
drome," thereby avoiding the impression that the complainant's 
symptoms could have been caused only by rape. 52 
324 N.W.2d at 230 (RTS is not a fact-finding tool, but a therapeutic tool useful in 
counseling); McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 232 (adopting Saldana rationale). 
45. See supra note 24. 
46. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 (quoting 
Saldana); Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230 (the testimony unduly prejudices the defend-
ant "by creating an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness"); McGee, 324 
N.W.2d at 232 (adopting Saldana rationale); Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241 ("There is a 
risk that the jury will regard the expert's opinion that a victim suffers from rape 
trauma syndrome resulting from a forcible assault as dispositive on the issue of 
consent."). 
47. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 170 (1967). 
48. H. K.ALVERN & H. ZIESEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 139 (1971). 
49. See Huey, 145 Ariz. at 63, 699 P.2d at 1294 ("This testimony would not invade the 
province of the jury. The expert would be subject to cross-examination and the jury 
could then determine what weight the evidence is to receive."); Marks, 231 Kan. at 
654, 647 P.2d at 1299 (the testimony does not invade the province of the jury be-
cause the expert is "subject to cross-examination and the jury is left to determine its 
weight"); Liddell, 685 P.2d at 923 ("skilled direct and cross-examination of an ex-
pert in this area can assist the jury in determining whether, in fact, the victim con-
sented to the act"). 
50. The Saldana court feared that the trial could tum into "a battle of the experts." 
Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230. This problem is avoidable. The trial judge, at his 
discretion, can limit the number of experts. See Wilk, supra note 23, at 456. In 
practice, it is unlikely that both sides will present so many experts with conflicting 
views that the jury will be confused. See H. KAL VERN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 48, 
at 139. 
51. See Weiner v. State, 55 Md. App. 548, 559,464 A.2d 1096, 1103 (1983) ("We recog-
nize that the law frequently permits the jury to hear evidence admitted for a limited 
purpose and presumes that the jury will follow a given instruction."); see also 
MARYLAND TRIAL JUDGES' BENCHBOOK ON EVIDENCE 10 (1984) ("When evi-
dence is admissible orily for a limited purpose ... on request the court should in-
struct the jury that the evidence may be considered only for the permissible 
purpose."). 
52. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251 n.14, 681 P.2d at 301 n.14, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 n.l4; 
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In Maryland, PTSD diagnostic testimony has been allowed, but, 
prior to Allewalt, no court had occasion to consider whether an expert 
may opine as to the cause of PTSD. In Wilson v. Jackson, 53 the court of 
special appeals stated that a psychiatrist could testify that an individual 
suffers from PTSD. 54 In Wilson, a policeman was subject to a civil rights 
action for failing to exercise due care. 55 The defense entered testimony 
from a doctor of clinical social work regarding the officer's illness due to 
a previous traumatic experience. The court held that the testimony was 
admissible because the expert did not state whether the defendant actu-
ally had PTSD. The court stated that "an opinion as to ultimate fact, 
whether or not the accused ... [suffers from a 'mental disease or defect'] 
... must be made by a medically trained psychiatrist in order to be ad-
missible in evidence."56 
Although PTSD testimony was not at issue, the court of appeals in 
Beahm v. Shortall 57 stated that a physician may express his opinion re-
garding the cause of an injury, aside from diagnosing the injury itself. 58 
The court permitted a doctor to testify not only about the nature of the 
plaintiff's lower back injury, but also that the injury was caused by an 
automobile accident. 59 Although not mandatory, the court added that a 
physician may state that his conclusion as to cause was derived in part by 
the plaintiff's own statements. 6o 
In State v. Allewalt, 61 the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in a case of 
first impression, held that an expert may testify not only that a rape com-
plainant exhibited symptoms of PTSD, but also that the symptoms were 
caused by rape.62 The court found that the probative value of the testi-
Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240 (expressing disapproval of "rape trauma syndrome" ter-
minology because that terminology creates a misimpression that there is a scientific 
judgment that the complainant was, in fact, raped). 
53. 66 Md. App. 744, 505 A.2d 913 (1986). 
54. Jd. at 752, 505 A.2d at 917. 
55. Id. at 747-48, 505 A.2d at 914. 
56. Jd. at 752, 505 A.2d at 917 (quoting Saul v. State, 6 Md. App. 540, 549-50,252 A.2d 
282, 286-87 (1969), aff'd, 258 Md. 100, 265 A.2d 178 (1970)). 
57. 279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977). 
58. Id. at 327, 368 A.2d at 1009. 
59. ld. at 329, 368 A.2d at 1010. The court stated, however, that it was error for the 
trial court to admit the doctor's testimony as to the subjective symptoms related to 
him by the patient without the limiting instruction that the testimony was only to 
show the basis of the doctor's conclusions. I d. 
60. Jd. at 327, 368 A.2d at 100. The court stated that the physician may present his 
"medical conclusions" and may present the "history and subjective symptoms" re-
ceived from the patient which provide the basis for the conclusions. I d. The Beahm 
opinion in no way indicates that the former is conditional upon the latter. See id. 
61. 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986). 
62. Jd. at 100, 517 A.2d at 747 ("Dr. Spodak was acting well within the field of his 
special training and experience not only when he made the diagnosis but [also] ... 
when he opined that the trauma was the rape described by the patient."). 
In a concurring opinion, Judge McAuliffe agreed that the testimony should be 
admissible in rape prosecutions, but opined that an expert should not be permitted 
to state whether the complainant in question suffered from PTSD. ld. at 125, 517 
A.2d at 759 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). According to Judge McAuliffe, the expert 
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mony outweighed its prejudicial effect.63 In finding that the diagnostic 
testimony was admissible, the court stated that "[t]here is no issue in this 
case over the fact that psychiatrists and psychologists recognize PTSD as 
an anxiety disorder. " 64 In finding that the causation testimony was ad-
missible, the court relied on Beahm v. Shortall, which allows for a physi-
cian to express his opinion as to the cause of an injury.65 
Regarding the diagnostic testimony, Allewalt is consistent with the 
majority view and prior Maryland case law. The court adopted a recog-
nized approach leading to an expected result. The court considered, as 
have others, whether a diagnosis of PTSD is accepted generally in the 
scientific community as a reliable indication of trauma. 66 The Allewalt 
court joined the majority view in holding that PTSD testimony is ac-
cepted generally in the scientific community. Consequently, the court's 
acceptance of the testimony was both logical and predictable. Addition-
should describe PTSD, list the type of traumas that cause the disorder, and discuss 
any temporal limitations on the cause-effect relationship, without expressing a con-
clusion as to whether the complainant actually suffered from the disorder. /d. at 
126, 517 A.2d at 760. The reason the expert should not be permitted to state 
whether the complainant had PTSD, Judge McAuliffe explained, was because the 
expert must assume the existence of a traumatic event in order to make a diagnosis 
ofPTSD. /d. at 126-27, 517 A.2d at 760. 
Judge Eldridge filed a lengthy dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by 
Judge Cole. /d. at Ill, 517 A.2d at 752, (Eldridge, J., dissenting). According to the 
dissent, PTSD should be excluded in rape prosecutions because it does not meet the 
Frye-Reed general acceptance test. /d. at Ill, 517 A.2d at 752. The dissent found 
additionally that the testimony's "minimal" probative value is "drastically out-
weighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues, and that the 
expert in Allewalt "impermissibly invaded the province of the jury by expressing an 
opinion about the credibility of the complaining witness's testimony." /d. 
The Allewalt majority, concurrence, and dissent appear to accept the defense's 
argument that the Allewalt expert expressed the opinion that the complainant was 
raped. Study of the record, however, does not support this conclusion. The expert 
did state that he was unaware of any other trauma the complainant had undergone 
that could have caused the PTSD, and also that rape could have caused the condi-
tion to the exclusion of all other possibilities. Record at 4-31. Such testimony falls 
short of an opinion that rape caused the complainant's distress. Indeed, the record 
reveals that the expert did not feel qualified to draw that conclusion. The expert 
clearly stated: "But to say in fact that she was raped, I am not sure that I feel 
qualified to do that." !d. (emphasis added). 
63. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 102-03, 517 A.2d 741, 747-48 (finding fault with the 
opinion of the intermediate appellate court that the testimony's prejudicial effect 
outweighed its probative value). 
64. /d. at 99, 517 A.2d at 746. 
65. /d. at 98-99, 517 A.2d at 745-46. The court stated: 
/d. 
Dr. Spodak's opinion that the PTSD which he diagnosed in Mrs. 
Lemon was caused by the rape which she described is as evidentiarily reli-
able as an opinion by an orthopedist who has been engaged only to testify 
ascribing a plaintiff's subjective complaints of low back pain to soft tissue 
injury resulting from an automobile accident described i~ the history given 
by the plaintiff. Maryland evidence law recognizes such medical opinions 
to be competent on and relevant to the issue of causation in addition to the 
fact of bodily harm. 
66. See supra note 24. 
152 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
ally, the court's reasoning is consistent with the court of special appeals 
decision in Wilson v. Jackson, 67 holding that a psychiatrist may present 
his diagnosis of a mental disorder. 68 
Regarding the causation portion of the testimony, however, the 
court adopted a novel approach to reach a novel result via its application 
of Beahm v. Shortall. 69 Other courts evaluated causation testimony 
under the general acceptance test, an approach usually leading to exclu-
sion of the evidence on the ground that PTSD is not reliable proof of 
rape, only of trauma.70 In Allewalt, however, the court relied upon 
Beahm v. Shortall, thereby avoiding the probable exclusion of the testi~ 
mony under the general acceptance analysis. 
In its application of Beahm to PTSD testimony, the court skillfully 
modified the Beahm holding to the special circumstances surrounding 
PTSD testimony. Although Beahm involved medical opinion regarding 
the cause of a physical injury, the Allewalt court applied it to psychiatric 
opinion regarding the cause of a mental disorder. More importantly, the 
Beahm court merely suggested that a physician may include in his causa-
tion testimony the "history and subjective symptoms received from the 
patient which provide the basis for the conclusions."71 In contrast, Al-
lewalt appears to set forth a mandatory requirement that the expert ex-
plain that his opinion as to causation is derived, at least in part, from the 
complainant's own statement of cause.72 
This requirement is implicit in the court's reasoning. The court 
67. 66 Md. App. 744, 505 A.2d 913 (1986). 
68. /d. at 752, 505 A.2d at 917 (quoting Saul v. State, 6 Md. App. 540, 549-50, 252 A.2d 
282, 286-87 (1969), aff'd, 258 Md. 100, 265 A.2d 178 (1970)). 
69. 279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977). 
70. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459 (rape trauma 
syndrome is not relied on in the scientific community to prove that a rape occurred). 
Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229 ("Rape trauma syndrome is not the type of scientific 
test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape occurred."); McGee, 324 
N.W.2d at 234 (adopting Saldana rationale); Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240 ("Dr. 
Amanat's statements that the prosecutrix suffered from rape trauma syndrome and 
that she had been raped are not sufficiently based on a scientific technique."). Pre-
sumably, these courts did not have case authority comparable to Beahm in their 
storehouse of precedent. 
71. Beahm, 279 Md. 321, 327, 368 A.2d 1005, 1009. 
72. The court implicitly set forth this requirement at several points in its discussion. In 
rejecting the holding of the intermediate appellate court that the expert's causation 
testimony was unduly prejudicial, the court stated that the holding of the intermedi-
ate court "ignores that Dr. Spodak's opinion that, based on the history, the stressor 
causing PTSD in Mrs. Lemon following June 25, 1983, was what she said was a 
rape occurring on that day." Allewalt, at 98, 368 A.2d at 745. Elsewhere the court 
emphasized that there was no undue prejudice because the expert "explained his 
opinion on causation by reference to the history obtained from Mrs. Lemon and by 
excluding other possible causes." Id. at 102, 368 A.2d at 747. Finally, toward the 
end of the opinion, the court reiterated that "[Dr. Spodak] did not claim that psy-
chiatry could demonstrate conclusively that the cause of the PTSD was rape. He 
did claim the special knowledge and experience to be able to identify the cause of 
the PTSD by utilizing the history furnished by the patient .... " Id. at 103, 368 
A.2d at 748. 
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stated that because the Allewalt expert "explained his opinion on causa-
tion by reference to the history obtained from Mrs. Lemon and by ex-
cluding other possible causes" the intermediate appellate court erred in 
finding undue prejudice. 73 The court also noted, "Having heard the evi-
dence the jury still had to evaluate the credibility of Mrs. Lemon and of 
Dr. Spodak, and to evaluate what weight, if any, they would give his 
opinion."74 Implicitly, the causation testimony would have been unduly 
prejudicial but for the psychiatrist's explanation that his opinion of cause 
was based partly on the witness's rendition of what had transpired. 
By requiring the expert to explain the basis for his opinion of causa-
tion, the Allewalt court avoided the danger that the jury might conclude 
that the causation opinion is a statement of scientific fact. Unless the jury 
is informed that the expert's opinion on causation is derived from the 
complainant's own statements, the jury could conclude that science has 
resolved the factual controversy as to whether a rape occurred and that 
further deliberation is unnecessary: The Allewalt requirement of an ex-
planation of the basis of the opinion of rape dilutes the prejudicial impact 
of the expert's opinion by allowing the jury to perceive that the opinion 
rests on the credibility of the complainant herself. Furthermore, the 
court effectively buttressed its acceptance of such testimony by noting 
that the expert did not use the terminology "rape trauma syndrome,"75 
that the expert carefully pointed out that severe traumas other than rape 
can cause PTSD, 76 and that the trial court used proper jury 
instructions. 77 
In Allewalt, the court reached a well reasoned holding in regard to 
the admissibility of PTSD testimony in a criminal rape trial. The court's 
holding that the diagnostic portion of the testimony is admissible because 
it is accepted generally in the scientific community is sound, although not 
surprising. Of greater significance is the holding that an expert can state 
that the complainant's PTSD symptoms were caused by rape. In reach-
ing that holding, the court skillfully accommodated the legitimate inter-
ests of both complainant and defendant. The complainant is allowed the 
benefit of this relevant opinion. The defendant is protected from any 
undue prejudice by the requirement that the expert explain that the basis 
of his opinion is the complainant's narrative. This careful accommoda-
tion of interests strikes a fine balance. 
Robert C. Sanders 
73. /d. at 102, 517 A.2d at 747. 
74. /d. at 103, 517 A.2d at 748. 
75. /d. at 108, 517 A.2d at 751. 
76. /d. 
77. /d. at 103, 517 A.2d at 748. In Allewa/t the trial judge instructed the jury that it 
"should give experts' testimony the weight and value you believe it should have. 
You are not required to accept any expert's opinion." /d. 
